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Abstract We examine whether outside directorships of chief executive officer/chief financial officer
(CEO/CFO) and resulting network ties to auditors affect auditor selection decisions and subsequent audit
quality. The network ties arise when the CEO/CFO of a firm (home firm) serves as an outside director of
another firm that hires an auditor (connected auditor). Using a sample of firms that switch auditors in the
post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act period, we find that home firms are more likely to appoint connected auditors.
We also find that home firms hiring connected auditors experience a significant decline in subsequent audit
quality, compared to those hiring non-connected auditors. Specifically, the increases in the likelihood of
misstatements, the magnitude of absolute discretionary accruals, and the propensity to meet or beat earnings
benchmarks after home firms appoint connected auditors are significantly greater, compared to those for
other firms switching to non-connected auditors. We further find that the decline in audit quality is more
pronounced when the network is established at the local office level.
Keywords: CEO/CFO outside directorship; Auditor selection; Audit quality; Auditor independence
JEL codes: G34; M40; M42
1. Introduction
Social network theory suggests that social and professional ties between economic agents influ-
ence their behavior and decision-makings (Granovetter, 2005). How these ties affect economic
activities has been an important research topic in recent accounting and finance literature. This
study examines whether outside directorships of a chief executive officer or chief financial officer
(CEO/CFO) and the resulting network ties to auditors affect auditor selection decisions. It also
examines how the appointment of such networked auditors influences subsequent audit quality.
CEO/CFOs of other firms are preferred candidates for independent outside directors because of
Correspondence Address: School of Business, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA23832, USA. Email:
mspark@vcu.edu
Paper accepted by Juha-Pekka Kallunki
© 2020 European Accounting Association
2 J. Yu et al.
their strategic leadership and finance/accounting expertise. Despite this preference, little consen-
sus exists on whether such outside directorships are beneficial or harmful to their home firms.
While some studies suggest that executives’ outside board directorship is related to managerial
opportunism and entrenchment (Davis, 1991; Zajac & Westphal, 1996), others argue that it can
enhance the home firm’s ability to obtain critical information and resources (Bacon & Brown,
1975; Fahlenbrach et al., 2010).1 Our study provides a unique setting to test these two different
views in the context of audits.
This study focuses on a network tie that arises when the CEO/CFO of a firm (home firm)
serves as an outside director of another firm (connected firm) that hires an auditor (connected
auditor). We call this relationship CEO/CFO-auditor interlocks (or network ties).2 The CEO/CFO
outside directorship provides an important opportunity to learn about an auditor and to build a
connection, but the implications of such a connection for the home firm’s auditor appointment
and subsequent audit outcome have been unexplored in prior studies.
Extant literature proposes two theories, embeddedness and agency views, with respect to exec-
utive outside directorship and its contribution to the home firms (Geletkanycz & Boyd, 2011;
Ruigrok et al., 2006; Shropshire, 2010). Under the embeddedness view, the CEO/CFOs with
outside directorships may prefer to hire a connected auditor through their network ties because
familiarity with the auditor can reduce the uncertainty of an incoming auditor and improve com-
munication and the working relationship.3 Even under the agency view, the CEO/CFOs can
still prefer hiring a connected auditor because, by appointing the connected auditor, they could
influence auditor reappointment and compensation decisions in both home and connected firms.
Consequently, they could be able to exercise greater bargaining power over the connected audi-
tor and increase the chances of more lenient audit judgments. Considering these possibilities,
we predict that the presence of CEO/CFO-auditor interlocks increases the likelihood that the
home firm will hire a connected auditor when the firm switches its auditor. We further examine
whether a home firm’s tendency to hire a connected auditor is more pronounced when the home
firm aims to hire a new auditor located in the same metropolitan statistical area (MSA) as the
connected auditor’s office (i.e. when the home firm’s network to the connected auditor can be at
audit office level rather than audit firm level) because the executives’ familiarity with the auditor
and bargaining power could be stronger in such a case.4
It is ex ante unclear, however, in which direction hiring a connected auditor will affect the sub-
sequent audit quality for the home firm. On the one hand, the embeddedness view implies that it
has a positive impact on audit quality because greater familiarity arising from a pre-existing rela-
tionship between the CEO/CFO and the connected auditor improves communication, facilitates
information transfers, and allows the auditor to better identify the officer’s reporting incentives
and the areas of risk in the home firm.5 Under this view, CEO/CFO-auditor ties will reduce
audit risk and thus improve audit quality. On the other hand, the agency view suggests that the
1Geletkanycz and Boyd (2011) and Ruigrok et al. (2006) call these two views ‘the embeddedness view’ and ‘the agency
view,’ respectively. We follow these studies and use the same terms.
2Among senior executives, we focus on the interlocking of CEO/CFOs because they play the most important roles in
financial reporting and auditor selection. We discuss this in detail in section 2.1.
3Furthermore, the likelihood of appointing a connected auditor can be higher when the auditor exhibits superior audit
quality for the connected firm. We examine this possibility in a later section.
4According to the U.S. Census Bureau Office for Management and Budget, a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) refers
to a geographical area normally with a large city and its neighboring areas in the U.S. Prior auditing studies often use
MSAs to identify the geographic location of a local audit practice office.
5Consistent with economic agents with pre-existing relationships enjoying better information flow, Cohen et al. (2008)
and L. Cohen et al. (2010) document that Wall Street money managers and financial analysts benefit from their social ties
with managers of public firms. Similarly, Engelberg et al. (2012) find that the presence of interpersonal links between
firm and bank managers improves monitoring by facilitating the exchange of information between lenders and borrowers.
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interlocking relationship can pose a threat to auditor independence because the auditor could
become more susceptible to the CEO/CFO’s pressure as the CEO/CFO can influence auditor
retention and audit fee decisions in both home and connected firms. Furthermore, organizational
research argues that homophily (i.e. an affinity for each other) established by frequent inter-
actions between economic agents reduces potential conflicts and creates mutual trust.6 In the
context of our setting, the established relationship between the CEO/CFO and the connected
auditor could lead the auditor to overestimate the trustworthiness of the CEO/CFO, resulting
in less objective audit risk assessment and insufficient substantive tests, and thereby adversely
affecting audit quality. Accordingly, how the appointment of a connected auditor will affect
subsequent audit quality for the home firm is an open question. Therefore, we hypothesize the
impact of an appointment of a connected auditor on subsequent audit quality as two competing
predictions.
To empirically test our predictions, we first identify auditor switching firms from Audit Ana-
lytics database and then collect data for CEO/CFOs’ board interlocks from BoardEx database,
both of which cover most public firms in the U.S. Our sample consists of 757 firms that switched
to Big 4 auditors during the period 2003–2015. Consistent with our prediction, we find that home
firms whose CEO/CFOs have network ties to auditors via outside directorships are more likely
to appoint connected auditors. For instance, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) is more likely to be
appointed as a new auditor for firms whose CEO/CFO serves as an outside director of another
firm that currently hires PwC, relative to other Big 4 firms. We find similar results for other Big
4 auditors. To gain more insights into the hiring of connected auditors, we perform additional
analyses after restricting the sample to home firms with at least one connected auditor, and we
find the followings. First, we find no evidence that the connected auditor’s audit quality for the
connected firm is associated with the home firm’s likelihood of hiring that auditor. Second, a
home firm’s tendency to hire a connected auditor is mitigated when its corporate governance is
stronger. Finally, a home firm is more likely to hire a connected auditor when such hiring leads
to the home and connected firms being audited by the same audit office.
Regarding the audit quality consequences of hiring connected auditors, we make use of a
difference-in-differences (DID) research design. Firms switching from a non-connected auditor
to a connected (non-connected) auditor comprise a treatment (control) group. For each treatment
and control firm, we retain two-year observations immediately before and after auditor change,
respectively. Using this DID research design, we find that hiring the connected auditors impairs
the subsequent audit quality in home firms. Specifically, home firms hiring the connected audi-
tors are more likely to misstate their financial statements, report greater absolute discretionary
accruals, and are more likely to meet or just beat important earnings benchmarks, compared to
those switching to non-connected auditors. Furthermore, the decline in audit quality is more pro-
nounced when such hiring leads to the home and connected firms being audited by the same audit
office. These findings remain unchanged when we use the propensity score matching approach
to mitigate concerns about the systematic differences in observable client firm characteristics.
Collectively, our findings suggest that CEO/CFO outside directorships increase the likelihood of
hiring a connected auditor and such hiring results in a deterioration of audit quality, consistent
more with the agency view.
6Regulators also recognize that familiarity or trust can be a threat to auditor independence. Specifically, Guide to Profes-
sional Ethics of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) recommends that auditors avoid
situations that may lead them to become over-influenced or to be too trusting of the client’s directors and management
which could consequently lead to audit staff being too sympathetic to the client interest (para 2.5 of Integrity, Objectivity,
and Independence).
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Our study contributes to the literature on the effects of top executives’ outside directorship on
home firms. Prior literature offers conflicting theories and evidence for whether an executive’s
outside board service will have a positive or negative impact on the home firm. While existing
studies examine this issue in the areas of firm performance, corporate governance, CEO com-
pensation, performance of mergers, and sensitivity of CEO turnover-to-performance (Balsmeier
et al., 2011; El-Khatib et al., 2015; Fich, 2005; Geletkanycz & Boyd, 2011), we contribute to this
literature by examining an unexplored issue of the effect on auditor selection and audit quality.
Understanding this issue is important because, although the demand for CEO/CFO service on
corporate boards is growing, the resultant network ties to auditors could increase the executive’s
ability to influence auditors’ objective assurance of accounting information.
Our study also contributes to the auditing literature. First, it adds to the auditor selection lit-
erature by documenting that CEO/CFO-auditor ties through outside directorships significantly
affect auditor selections among Big 4 auditors, particularly when the tie is developed at the local
audit office level. Second, we extend the literature on the effect of CEO/CFO-auditor ties on
audit quality by examining a new type of ties via CEO/CFO outside directorships.7
While prior studies in this literature focus on the ties via audit firm alumni affiliation and edu-
cation (Baber et al., 2014; Dhaliwal et al., 2015; Geiger et al., 2008; Guan et al., 2016; Kwon
& Yi, 2018; Menon & Williams, 2004), this study is distinct from them in the following ways.
First, while the negative effect of alumni affiliation and school ties on audit quality in prior
studies mirrors psychological bias arising from social connections, our measure of CEO/CFO-
auditor interlocks captures the executive’s greater bargaining power over auditors because in our
setting, auditors may perceive the interlocked CEO/CFOs as more powerful and economically
important, given that they can exert influence over auditor retention and audit fee decisions in
both home and connected firms. Because prior social connection settings do not involve such
bargaining power and economic incentive issues, their results do not directly translate into the
implications of our study. Second, our study also highlights that network ties to auditors matter
more at the local audit office level than at the audit firm level by providing evidence that clients
are more likely to hire auditors connected at local audit office level and exert greater influence
over them. This local-level network was not considered in the prior studies on alumni affilia-
tion in the U.S.8 Third, this study complements the existing literature by adopting a research
design that better addresses identification challenges. Unlike prior studies that mainly perform
cross-sectional analyses for the analyses of audit quality, we use both a DID research design
and a propensity-score matching technique to mitigate potential endogeneity issues.9 Finally,
7We note that Lennox and Yu (2016) examines the network ties of (both inside and outside) directors and executives to
auditors, similar to our study. They find that firms are more likely to appoint auditors with whom directors and executives
are acquainted through external directorships and that hiring those auditors is positively associated with auditor tenure
and audit quality. Since the roles and incentives of outside directors are quite different from those of executives, our focus
on CEO/CFO-auditor ties establishes a clearer setting to examine top executives’ motives for hiring connected auditors
(i.e., embeddedness view vs. agency view). Lennox and Yu (2016)’s inconsistent results on audit quality may come from
examining the interlocks of executives and outside directors together, despite their different roles and incentives, and/or
using a different research design. Our additional analysis with a DID research design in a subsequent section indicates
that hiring auditors connected to home firms’ AC members through external directorship does not significantly affect
subsequent audit quality. Unlike Lennox and Yu (2016), we also document that the effect of CEO/CFO-auditor ties on
auditor selection and audit quality is more pronounced when the tie is established at the local office level.
8Using audit office data in Audit Analytics, we check whether home firms hire an audit office to which CEO/CFOs have
a connection. In alumni affiliation research, it is almost impossible to identify an audit office where an affiliated officer
worked in the past. Studies on school ties use non-U.S. data and thus generalizability to the U.S. is uncertain.
9Since we use a DID research design in a non-random setting as in prior literature (e.g., Francis et al., 2017; Jiang et
al., 2018). Nevertheless, our research design may not completely solve the endogeneity concerns because auditor change
does not occur randomly. To further mitigate the endogeneity concerns particularly related to the analysis of subsequent
audit quality, we combine our DID research design with propensity-score matching technique, as discussed later. It is also
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this study has important regulatory implications regarding CEO/CFO-auditor interlocks. While
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) requires a one-year cooling-off period before an audit
firm employee accepts an executive position at a former client, our findings suggest that another
form of client-auditor ties can still impair audit quality. Thus, given the potential downside of
the CEO/CFO-auditor interlocks on audit quality, regulators should consider developing mecha-
nisms that discourage clients’ opportunistic auditor switches, such as disclosure of any existing
CEO/CFO-auditor interlocks.
In Section 2, we discuss prior literature and develop hypotheses. Section 3 describes the
sample selection and research design. Section 4 discuss empirical results, and section 5
concludes.
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
2.1. Social and Professional Networks of Corporate Stakeholders
Social network theory predicts that social and professional ties between individuals affect their
behavior and economic outcomes (Granovetter, 2005). The theory often defines social and busi-
ness ties in terms of mutual qualities and experiences, such as school ties, geographical origins,
family ties, and corporate experience, and emphasizes the importance of these ties in analyzing
economic activities in modern industrial society.
In one direction, the theory predicts that social ties enhance trust and facilitate information
flows between related individuals because whereas a third party must follow a formal commu-
nication protocol, related parties could lower information costs and save communication time.
Moreover, related parties are more likely to share proprietary information within the same social
network than with a third party. Consistent with this prediction, Cohen et al. (2008) and L. Cohen
et al. (2010) document that Wall Street money managers and financial analysts benefit from their
social ties with managers of public firms. Similarly, Engelberg et al. (2012) show that school or
professional ties between managers of banks and firms improve information flow and lending
efficiency, leading to lower borrowing costs.
In contrast, other studies highlight the possibility that social ties can create a deadweight loss
by promoting collusion (Hwang & Kim, 2009; Uzzi, 1996) because related parties tend to inter-
pret others’ actions in a biased manner, and their ties could promote social conformity to the
norm, rather than to economic optimization. Consistent with this argument, several account-
ing and finance studies examine various ties between executives and independent directors,
and find that their ties result in weak corporate governance and poor financial reporting quality
(Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2014; Fracassi & Tate, 2012; Hwang & Kim, 2009).
2.2. Embeddedness and Agency Views
Prior research on social networks propose two theories on executives’ outside board service and
its contribution to their home firm: embeddedness and agency views (Geletkanycz & Boyd, 2011;
Ruigrok et al., 2006; Shropshire, 2010). The embeddedness view argues that a corporate leader
is influenced by relations to other leaders and by the structure of the network of relations such
as board interlocks. It also argues that such relations provide an important source of information
and communication. Under this view, outside directorships are considered beneficial to the home
firms because they afford access to important policies and practices of other firms, which in turn
noteworthy that firms switch their auditor at a different point in time, so our DID research design is staggered. Hence,
we do not believe that our results are driven by macroeconomic factors we are unable to observe.
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helps the executives to manage their home firms successfully. For instance, executives sitting on
outside boards can learn about other firms’ different management styles and alternative strategies
without incurring costs to their home firms (Beckman & Haunschild, 2002; Booth & Deli, 1996;
Burt, 1987; Larcker & Tayan, 2015). Sitting on other boards also enables executives to establish
a network with other directors (Fahlenbrach et al., 2010) and get referrals for clients and sup-
pliers (Larcker & Tayan, 2015). Bacon and Brown (1975) summarize the potential benefits of
executives’ outside directorships as follows: (a) benchmarking of others, (b) gaining exposure to
innovation, (c) obtaining information, (d) gaining exposure to alternative management systems,
and (e) receiving counsel.
On the other hand, the agency view suggests that, although executives enjoy financial bene-
fits and other perquisites from outside directorships, little utility is accrued to their home firms
(Davis, 1991). Rather, it argues that multiple directorships are an indicator of personal prestige
and power. Consistent with this perspective, prior literature shows that top executives who hold
outside directorships tend to be more powerful in board decisions and thus in a better position
to entrench themselves and to behave opportunistically. For instance, executives receive numer-
ous rewards from outside directorships, including board pay and pension (Yermack, 2004), as
well as elevated prestige and standing in social circles (Useem, 1984). This elevated profes-
sional standing enables the executives to demand higher pay at home firms (Zajac & Westphal,
1996) and to exercise greater intra-organizational power (Finkelstein, 1992), which increases
the possibility of managerial entrenchment. Consistent with this possibility, studies find that top
executives’ outside board ties are associated with a lower sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm
performance (Balsmeier et al., 2011), value-destroying mergers (El-Khatib et al., 2015), and the
adoptions of golden parachutes (Wade et al., 1990) and poison pills (Davis, 1991), all of which
protect managers’ interests at the expense of shareholders. In sum, these studies suggest that
outside directorship not only distracts executives from their internal duties but also advances the
executives’ personal interests at the expense of the home firm and its shareholders.
Among senior executives, we examine the interlocking of CEO/CFO for the following reasons.
First, SOX recognizes the role of the two executives in financial reporting by requiring them to
certify the fairness of their financial statements. Second, the two executives still influence audi-
tor selection decisions, even though SOX mandates that the audit committee (AC hereafter) be
directly responsible for appointment and oversight of auditors (J. Cohen et al. (2010); Dhaliwal
et al., 2015; Fiolleau et al., 2013) and that auditors also perceive that CEO/CFOs have powers to
switch auditors with little friction with the AC (Gendron & Bédard, 2006). Third, the AC often
interacts with the CEO/CFO. CFOs attend most AC meetings, and in some cases, CEOs also
attend the meetings. Thus, the two executives have more influence over audit-related matters
and financial reporting than other senior executives.
2.3. Hypotheses Development
A firm’s board members and its auditor are endowed with opportunities to interact with each
other and build networks. Auditors can access board meeting minutes and attend AC meetings,
through which they can interact with board members and executives (Dhaliwal et al., 2016).
Auditors also liaise with the board members to discuss critical issues such as financial distress,
restructuring, and internal controls (Cohen et al., 2007).10 When a CEO/CFO of a firm serves
on the board of directors of another firm, an important opportunity opens for both the CEO/CFO
10The AICPA’s auditing standards in the U.S. (AU section 325) states that auditors are required to directly
report to the board of directors if they become aware that ‘the oversight of the company’s external finan-
cial reporting and internal control over financial reporting by the company’s audit committee is ineffective.’
(https://pcaobus.org/Standards/Auditing/Pages/AU325b.aspx)
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and the connected firm’s auditor to build network ties to each other. From the perspective of the
CEO/CFO, the network ties support making informed decisions when their home firm seeks a
new auditor because the CEO/CFO can learn about the connected auditor’s various attributes,
such as audit quality, objectivity, and judgments about risky and controversial issues. Since such
knowledge reduces uncertainty regarding auditor replacement in the future, the CEO/CFO direc-
tor is likely to have incentives to develop and maintain networks with the connected auditor. On
the flip side, the connected auditor also has incentives to build network ties with the CEO/CFO
director because they provide a good opportunity to expand the pool of future clients. In accor-
dance, we expect that the connected firm can partially play a platform role for developing the
network ties between the CEO/CFO director and connected auditor.
According to the embeddedness view, the CEO/CFO’s board networks could enable the home
firm to make a more informed auditor selection decision because the CEO/CFO has more
knowledge about the connected auditor through observations and interactions, thereby reducing
uncertainty about an incoming auditor. Moreover, given the pre-existing knowledge and working
experience, the CEO/CFO will be able to communicate more effectively and establish a better
working relationship with the connected auditor, which is one of the most important factors in
selecting auditor (Beattie & Fearnley, 1995; Dodgson et al., 2020; Eichenseher & Shields, 1983;
McCracken et al., 2008).11 In this case, the home firm may prefer to hire the connected auditor
when switching auditors.
Under the agency view, the CEO/CFO may prefer to appoint a cozy auditor who can provide
more lenient audit judgments. By hiring the connected auditor, the CEO/CFO could exercise
greater bargaining power over the auditor because the CEO/CFO can at least indirectly exert
influence on auditor reappointment and compensation decisions in both home and connected
firms. Prior studies suggest that CEO directors maintain elevated status among independent board
members and thus have greater clout in making board- or committee-level decisions (Erkens &
Bonner, 2013; Fich, 2005; Westphal & Stern, 2006). In addition, given that CFOs have exten-
sive accounting knowledge and experience, the connected firm’s board and AC members are
likely to pay more attention to the CFO director’s view on accounting/auditing related issues.
The elevated status of CEO/CFO directors empowers them to exercise large influence over
the AC’s perception of the auditor at their connected firm. Thus, the CEO/CFOs may prefer
to hire connected auditors at their home firm to the extent that they expect to exert influence over
the connected auditor using their greater bargaining power when resolving important issues in
auditor-client contracting and audit adjustments for their home firms.
Although those incentives exist, SOX mandated that the AC be directly responsible for
appointment and oversight of auditors. If SOX is effective in removing CEO/CFO influence over
auditor selection, no relationship between CEO/CFO-auditor interlocks and auditor selection will
be observed, especially when the CEO/CFO’s preference for the connected auditor is attributable
to the agency view. In contrast, if AC members of the home firm largely support hiring auditors
preferred by the CEO/CFO, the interlocks may affect the selection of the connected auditor.
Prior research finds evidence consistent with the latter case. For instance, Gendron and Bédard
(2006) suggest that AC members mostly do not oppose management’s decision to not renew the
incumbent auditor. Other studies report that managers continue to influence auditor selection and
11McCracken et al. (2008) document that, when audit firms assign their audit partners, they consider client CFOs’ prefer-
ences for certain partners, suggesting that the relationship between client CFO and audit partner is important for auditing.
One interviewee of Dodgson et al. (2020) states, ‘Management can express a preference to the AC, because management
wants to make sure that they get somebody they can work with and that knows their business and that can deal with issues
in a timely manner.’ Another interview participant says, ‘You’re generally not going to see an AC insist on engagement
partner that the management team objects to. I think the AC understands the working relationship aspects of this too.’
The evidence indicates the importance of the relationship between client executives and auditors.
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retention decisions after SOX (J. Cohen et al. (2010); Dhaliwal et al., 2015; Fiolleau et al., 2013).
Beck and Mauldin (2014) also find that, even after SOX, CFOs significantly influence audit fee
decisions. These results raise doubt about the effectiveness of SOX with respect to controlling
management influence over audit-related matters. Therefore, we predict that CEO/CFO-auditor
interlocks increase the likelihood that the home firm hires a connected auditor. This prediction
leads to the following hypothesis in an alternative form:
H1: A home firm is more likely to appoint a connected auditor when the firm switches its auditor.
When the home firm switches to a connected auditor, it is unclear how the CEO/CFO-auditor
interlocking relation affects subsequent audit quality. The embeddedness view suggests that the
relation could have a positive impact on audit quality because of effective communication and
information transfers between auditor and client. Prior research also suggests that network ties
among economic agents improve information transfer and reduce costs of gathering information
(Cai & Sevilir, 2012; Engelberg et al., 2012). As such, the connected auditor has better access
to information about managers and their reporting incentives, which in turn helps the auditor
to identify audit risk and resolve potential problems in a timely manner. Moreover, improved
information transfer will allow the auditor to better understand the client’s business model and
future plans, details of transactions and accounts, and internal control system. Collectively, these
benefits enable the auditor to plan and organize the audit process in more effective ways, thereby
improving audit quality.
Alternatively, the CEO/CFO-auditor networks may pose a threat to auditor independence
under the agency view. As discussed earlier, hiring a connected auditor may provide the
CEO/CFO with greater bargaining power over the auditor because the CEO/CFO can affect
audit engagements for both home and connected firms. DeAngelo (1981) documents that auditors
have incentives to retain economically important clients. In our setting, auditors may perceive
the interlocked CEO/CFOs as more powerful and economically important due to their ability to
exert influence over auditor retention and audit fee decisions in both home and connected firms.
In fact, prior studies indicate that auditors are less likely to issue a going concern opinion and are
more likely to waive proposed audit adjustments for larger clients (McKeown et al., 1991; Nel-
son et al., 2002). These studies suggest that the connected auditor can be more susceptible to the
CEO/CFO’s pressure to obtain lenient audit outcomes, thereby inducing lower audit quality.12
Moreover, the network ties between the CEO/CFO and auditor could create favoritism bias
(i.e. tendency to interpret connected others’ intentions and actions favorably) (Guan et al., 2016).
Prior studies in sociology argue that frequent interactions between people tend to create ties as
well as mutual caring and trust (McPherson et al., 2001; Silver, 1990). The favoritism bias may
induce the auditor to overestimate the trustworthiness of the CEO/CFO and to be less skeptical
about management representation (Nelson, 2009), which may result in a less objective audit risk
assessment and insufficient substantive tests, adversely affecting audit quality.
While several studies in auditing research explore how network ties between client firm exec-
utives and auditors affect audit outcomes, these studies mostly concentrate on the effect of the
ties via education or audit firm alumni affiliation and provide mixed evidence on audit quality.
For example, while Guan et al. (2016) find that the presence of auditors’ school ties to the client
executives in China is associated with impaired audit quality, Kwon and Yi (2018) document
that CEO-auditor school ties in Korea are associated with high-quality audits. In addition, while
12It is possible that the connected auditor is unwilling to compromise independence, despite the CEO/CFO’s bargaining
power, given that SOX implemented numerous steps to improve audit quality and auditor independence. Moreover,
the newly created Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) increased both oversight and penalties for
audit-related deficiencies. Under this possibility, the CEO/CFO’s great bargaining power may not result in lowered audit
quality.
The Impact of CEO/CFO Outside Directorships on Auditor Selection and Audit Quality 9
Lennox (2005) and Menon and Williams (2004) find that when audit firm alumni serve as exec-
utives of client firms, these firms are less likely to receive going concern opinions and tend to
report higher absolute discretionary accruals (consistent with lower audit quality), Geiger et al.
(2008) find that these firms exhibit a lower likelihood of the SEC’s enforcement actions (consis-
tent with higher audit quality) and that the magnitude of their discretionary accruals is indifferent
from others. Extending the sample to the post-SOX period, Dhaliwal et al. (2015) report that audit
firm affiliated officers continue to be more likely to appoint their alma mater auditors but show
that such hiring does not impair auditor independence in the post-SOX period. Other studies
examine how the market reacts to the news of hiring an affiliated officer and provide also mixed
results (Baber et al., 2014; Geiger et al., 2008).
Overall, prior studies for executive-auditor ties provide mixed evidence on the impact of the
ties on audit quality and market response, in line with conflicting predictions based on the embed-
dedness and agency views. Taken together, the appointment of a connected auditor can either
improve or impair the subsequent audit quality for the home firm. These possibilities lead to the
following two competing hypotheses:
H2a: Hiring a connected auditor improves audit quality for the home firm.
H2b: Hiring a connected auditor impairs audit quality for the home firm.
It is possible that the effect of network ties between CEO/CFOs and auditors is greater when
the ties arise at the local level, because their familiarity with each other and the CEO/CFO’s
bargaining power can be stronger in such a case. To examine this possibility, we further investi-
gate whether the home firm’s preference to hire a connected auditor is stronger when such hiring
leads to the home firm being audited by the same local audit office as the connected firm. We
also examine whether hiring a connected auditor has a greater impact on audit quality when the
home and connected firms are audited by the common audit office.13
3. Sample Selection and Research Design
3.1. Measuring CEO/CFO-Auditor Interlocks
To measure CEO/CFO-auditor interlocks, we first identify CEO/CFOs and their outside direc-
torships using the BoardEx database.14 To comprehensively identify CEO/CFO outside director-
ships and to focus on the current post-SOX regime, we limit our sample period to 2003–2015.15
We then collect each firm’s auditor identity from Audit Analytics. When a CEO/CFO serves as an
13The effect of the network ties on auditor selection and audit quality can be even stronger if the ties are developed with
the same engagement audit partner for both home and connected firms. Since the disclosure of engagement audit partner
only came into effect in 2017, we do not have enough data to perform meaningful analyses for this possibility.
14From the database, CEOs are identified based on the following titles: CEO, interim CEO, co-CEO, group CEO, chief
executive (officer), group chief executive (officer), company leader, and group leader. Similarly, CFOs are identified
based on the following titles: CFO, co-CFO, interim CFO, group CFO, CFO (part-time), chief financial/finance (officer),
and principal financial/finance (officer).
15BoardEx provides biographical information about senior managers and board members. The database started to collect
the information in 2003, backfilling data to 2000. In 2005, BoardEx carried out a major extension of its coverage,
backfilling data to 2003, which substantially increased the coverage. Our exploration of the database reveals that the
number of U.S. firms covered by BoardEx increased from 2,028 in 2002 to 4,154 in 2003. Its coverage gradually increases
in subsequent years, providing annual data for more than 5,000 firms in recent years. Despite the extended coverage, we
might fail to identify some CEO/CFOs’ external directorships because BoardEx does not cover all public firms in the
U.S. However, this failure is likely to bias against our findings.
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outside director of another firm hiring a certain auditor, the CEO/CFO is considered to have net-
work ties to the auditor. If a CEO/CFO serves on the boards of multiple firms that hire different
auditors, the CEO/CFO is treated as having network ties to each of those auditors.16
3.2. Sample Selection
The sample selection procedure for auditor choice analysis is outlined in Panel A of Table 1.
Starting from an intersection of Compustat and Audit Analytics 2003 onwards, our initial sam-
ple consists of 1,547 firm-year observations involving a switch to Big 4 auditors. We limit the
sample to firms switching to Big 4 auditors to make our sample firms relatively homogenous.
Furthermore, since very few observations are tied to non-Big 4 auditors, it would be difficult to
implement our auditor selection analysis for non-Big 4 auditors. We further exclude 246 obser-
vations with a fiscal year end of 2016 or later because our audit quality analyses require two-year
observations subsequent to auditor switching. We then eliminate 243 observations with missing
SIC codes from Compustat or in financial services industries (SIC codes 6000–6999). We also
drop 252 observations that are not covered by BoardEx. Finally, we remove 49 observations due
to a missing value on any of the control variables for auditor selection analysis. Accordingly, we
are left with 757 observations switching to Big 4 auditors. Panel B of Table 1 presents yearly
distribution of auditor switch sample. We note that the sample is not clustered in a certain year.
To test the impact of hiring connected auditors on subsequent audit quality, we implement a
DID research design. In detail, we compare the change in audit quality from the pre- to post-
auditor-switch periods for firms switching from a non-connected auditor to a connected one (i.e.
treatment firms), to the change for other firms switching from a non-connected auditor to another
non-connected one (i.e. control firms). We employ three proxies for audit quality: misstatements,
absolute discretionary accruals, and meeting or beating earnings benchmarks (analysts’ consen-
sus forecasts and last year earnings). For each treatment and control firm, we retain two-year
observations immediately before and after auditor change, respectively. To test with balanced
panel data, if any of the required variables during the four consecutive years for a firm are miss-
ing, all observations of the firm are dropped.17 After applying these criteria, our sample for audit
quality analysis ranges from 596 (149 unique firms) to 1,680 (420 unique firms).18
3.3. Research Design
3.3.1. Auditor selection model
To investigate whether auditor switching firms are more likely to appoint a connected auditor
among the Big 4, we estimate the following logistic model for each of the Big 4 auditors, adapted
from Dhaliwal et al. (2015) and Lennox and Park (2007):19
XX = α0 + α1ConnXX + α2SpecXX + α3MatchXX + α4AlumniXX + α5FBig4 + ε (1)
16Among 757 auditor switching firms in the final sample, we find that the CEO/CFOs of 513 firms do not serve as
outsider directors of any firms covered by BoardEx. The CEO/CFOs of 162 firms serve as outside directors of only one
firm in the BoardEx universe. The CEO/CFOs of 56 (17, 8, 1) firms have two (three, four, five) external directorships, so
some have connections to more than one audit firm.
17Our results are qualitatively similar when we use unbalanced panel data without this restriction.
18Due to the smaller coverage of I/B/E/S, the sample for the analysis of meeting/beating analysts’ consensus forecasts
is limited to 596 (149 unique firms). The sample size for this analysis is commonly smaller than for other audit quality
analyses such as misstatements or discretionary accruals (e.g., Reichelt & Wang, 2010).
19We measure variables in the year immediately before auditor changes, consistent with Lennox and Park (2007) and
Dhaliwal et al. (2015). For conciseness, we omit firm and year subscripts.
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Table 1. Sample selection.
Panel A: Sample Selection for Auditor Selection Analyses
Firms switching auditors to a Big 4 audit firm 2003 onwards
with valid CIK and auditor identity from an intersection
of Compustat and Audit Analytics
1,547
Less: Those with a fiscal year end of 2016 or later (246)
Less: Those in financial services industries (SIC codes
6000–6999) or those without valid SIC codes
(243)
Less: Those not covered by BoardEx (252)
Less: Those with a missing value on any of the control
variables for auditor selection analyses
(49)
Number of firms used in auditor selection analyses 757
















Panel A details the sample selection process for auditor selection analyses. Panel B provides the yearly distribution of
auditor switch sample that is used for auditor selection analyses.
where the dependent variable XX is an indicator variable equal to one if the incoming auditor is
XX, and zero otherwise, where XX is PwC, EY, Deloitte, or KPMG. For example, PwC is equal to
one if the firm appoints PwC as its new auditor and zero if the firm appoints one of the other three
auditors. Our variable of interest, ConnXX, is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO/CFO
of the firm serves as an independent director of another firm who hires the auditor XX, and zero
otherwise.20 Our H1 predicts α1 > 0.
Following prior research, we control for several factors that may influence firms’ auditor selec-
tion. SpecXX is an indicator variable equal to one if the auditor XX has the largest market share
of audit fees in the industry-year cohort to which the given client belongs, and zero otherwise.
MatchXX is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is better matched with XX than with any
of the other Big 4 auditors, and zero otherwise, which is estimated based on Lennox and Park’s
(2007) clientele match model. AlumniXX is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO, CFO,
or chief accounting officer formerly worked for the auditor XX, and zero otherwise.21 FBig4
is an indicator variable equal to one if the predecessor auditor was a Big 4 auditor, and zero
otherwise.
20Note that firms currently hiring XX (e.g., PwC) are not able to switch to XX (e.g., PwC). Thus, we estimate Eq. (1)
after dropping firms whose predecessor auditor corresponds to XX.
21Executives’ former working experiences in the audit profession are manually collected from proxy statements of
our sample firms. Based on this, we construct AlumniXX. Similarly, we construct two other alumni-related variables,
AlumniConn and AlumniAud, which serve as a control in regression equation (2) and (3), respectively.
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To gain more insights into auditor selection decisions, we limit our sample to home firms
with at least one connected auditor and investigate what characteristics of home firms are asso-
ciated with hiring a connected auditor, conditional on the existence of any connected auditor.
Specifically, we examine whether the likelihood of hiring a connected auditor is related to (1)
the auditor’s audit quality for the connected firm, (2) the strength of the home firm’s corporate
governance, and (3) whether the home firm hires a new auditor located in the same MSA of the
connected auditor’s office (i.e. when the home firm’s network to the connected auditor can be at
audit office level rather than audit firm level).22 We estimate the following model adapted from
Lennox and Park (2007):
HiringConn = β0 + β1ConnAQ + β2GovIndex + β3SameMSA + β4SameInd + β6MatchConn
+ β7AlumniConn + β8SpecConn + β9FBig4 + β10LogTA
+ β11BankruptcyScore + β12LitIndustry + β13AudDismissal + ε (2)
where HiringConn is an indicator variable equal to one if the home firm hires its connected audi-
tor, and zero otherwise. ConnAQ is one of ConnAQ1 to ConnAQ4. ConnAQ1 equals one if the
connected firm does not misstate its financial statement in the past two years, and zero otherwise.
ConnAQ2 (ConnAQ3) equals one if the average of the connected firm’s absolute discretionary
accruals measured by the modified Jones model (Kothari et al., 2005) in the past two years
belong to the lowest quartile, and zero otherwise. ConnAQ4 equals one if the connected firm
does not meet or just beat last year earnings in the past two years, and zero otherwise. Accord-
ingly, ConnAQ variables are intended to capture audit quality at connected firms in years t-1 and
t-2 where t is the auditor change year. The value of one for ConnAQ indicates high audit quality.
GovIndex equals one if the home firm’s corporate governance index is greater than its median of
our sample, and zero otherwise, where the index is a composite measure based on CEO/chairman
duality, internally promoted or externally hired CEO/CFO, board independence, the proportion of
co-opted directors (i.e. those who joined the board after the CEO appointed), and AC accounting
expertise.23 SameMSA equals one if the home firm’s incoming auditor’s office and the connected
auditor’s office are located in the same MSA, and zero otherwise. SameInd equals one if the
home firm and its connected firm are in the same industry based on the two-digit SIC code, and
zero otherwise. Definitions for the other control variables are presented in the Appendix.
3.3.2. Audit quality models
Following a comprehensive review of DeFond and Zhang (2014), we use three commonly used
proxies for audit quality: misstatements, discretionary accruals, and meeting/beating earnings
22The most straightforward way to examine whether home firms are more likely to hire auditors from the same connected
office is to estimate equation (1) while treating each of the audit offices as a distinct auditor. However, this approach is
not feasible because it requires running numerous regressions (for each of the Big 4 audit firms’ audit offices, which total
more than 250) with only few observations hiring a specific audit office. Alternatively, we use the location of a home
firm’s incoming auditor’s office, which is available ex post, to infer where the home firm looks for its incoming auditor.
Using this information, we test whether the likelihood of hiring a connected auditor is stronger when the incoming
auditor’s office and the connected auditor’s office are located in the same MSA.
23To construct GovIndex, we first calculate the sum of the following indicator variables: I (the CEO does not hold the
position of chairman), I (the CEO/CFO is externally hired), I (the home firm’s board independence is equal to or greater
than its median of our sample), I (the home firm’s co-opted directors is lower than its median of our sample), and I
(the home firm’s AC includes at least one accounting expert) where I (.) is the operator to return one if the condition of
the argument is satisfied, and zero otherwise. For each of five dimensions, if I (.) yields one, then the firm has a strong
corporate governance for the dimension. We then define GovIndex as one if the sum is equal to or greater than the median
of our sample.
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benchmarks. These proxies capture complementary dimensions of audit quality, such as both
egregious audit failures and mild ‘within GAAP’ earnings management, and both discrete and
continuous measures.24 We obtain inferences from these multiple proxies because each measure
has both weaknesses and strengths (DeFond & Zhang, 2014).
DeFond and Subramanyam (1998) find that auditors’ preference for conservative accounting
is systematically associated with discretionary accruals in pre- and post-auditor-switch periods.
Shu (2000) also argues that auditor changes are associated with increased auditor litigation risk
and client financial distress, which could bias our audit quality tests if we perform tests only with
the sample of firms that switch to connected auditors. To mitigate these concerns, we employ
a DID research design using firms switching from non-connected auditors to connected ones as
treatment firms, and firms switching from non-connected auditors to other non-connected ones
as control firms.25 Since we use the changes in audit quality for control firms to capture common
auditor change effects, we regard the difference in the changes between treatment and control
firms as the incremental effect of hiring connected auditors over the common effects.
To test the effect of hiring a connected auditor on subsequent audit quality for the home firm,
we estimate the following model:26
AuditQual = γ0 + γ1Post + γ2Treat + γ3Post ∗ Treat + γ Controls
+ Industry dummies + Year dummies + ε (3)
AuditQual is a proxy for audit quality: misstatement, absolute discretionary accruals, or meet-
ing/beating earnings benchmarks. Our first proxy is the likelihood of restating financial state-
ments. Restatements are direct and egregious measures of audit quality because they indicate
that previously reported financial statements were unreliable and that auditors failed to correct
the misstatements (Christensen et al., 2016). For this measure, we define misstatement as one if
the firm-year financial statements are overstated and thus subsequently restated downward, and
zero otherwise.27 Thus, if hiring a connected auditor leads to lower (higher) audit quality, firms
appointing such auditors are more (less) likely to misstate financial statements and thus issue
restatements in a subsequent period.
Our second proxy is absolute discretionary accruals. Since Keung and Shih (2014) suggest that
performance-matching procedures in Kothari et al. (2005) may introduce noise into measure-
ment of discretionary accruals, we use both performance-matched and unmatched discretionary
24Another popular measure of audit quality is the auditor’s propensity to issue going-concern opinions. We are unable to
employ this measure because all firms switching to a connected auditor in our sample receive a clean audit opinion for
both pre- and post-auditor-switch periods.
25Among 757 auditor switching firms, 90 (608) firms switched from a non-connected auditor to a connected (non-
connected) auditor, forming our treatment (control) group. These sample sizes are greater than those of Dhaliwal et al.
(2015), who find that, among 420 post-SOX Big 4 appointments, 52 (368) firms switched to an affiliated (non-affiliated)
auditor. Note that we exclude 48 (11) firms that switched from a connected auditor to a non-connected (another con-
nected) auditor from our audit quality test samples to obtain clean treatment and control firms. Since the number of these
firms is too small, we could not implement meaningful tests for the changes in audit quality.
26As described in our sample selection process earlier, our sample for audit quality analyses includes two-year obser-
vations immediately before and after auditor change respectively. All variables are measured at their-fiscal-year end, so
they are time-varying. For conciseness, we omit firm and year subscripts.
27Prior studies (e.g., Kim et al., 2003) argue that auditors tend to be more concerned about their clients’ income-
increasing misstatements which are more likely intentional and egregious. From the entire population from Audit
Analytics, we confirm that about 86% of the restatements are income-decreasing ones that resulted from income-
increasing misstatements. While we exclude income-decreasing misstatements from the sample, untabulated results
reveal that our results are qualitatively similar irrespective of whether we classify income-decreasing misstatements
to misstatement sample or not. When we further limit our misstatement sample to those with accounting-related
misstatement, we find that our results remain qualitatively similar.
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accruals. |PMDA| is the absolute value of performance-matched discretionary accruals (Kothari
et al., 2005) and |DA| is the absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated from the modified
Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995). If CEO/CFO-auditor interlocks lead to lower (higher) audit
quality, we expect firms switching to the connected auditor to report greater (smaller) absolute
discretionary accruals.
Our third proxy measures the auditor’s ability to limit earnings management to meet or just
beat two earnings benchmarks: analysts’ consensus forecasts and last year earnings. MeetCon-
sensus equals one if earnings meet or just beat the latest analysts’ consensus earnings forecasts
by three cents per share or less, and zero otherwise. MeetLast equals one if the firm’s earnings
in this year meet or just beat its last year earnings by three percent of the market capitalization
at the beginning of the year, and zero otherwise.28 If connected auditors are less (more) likely
to detect and constrain earnings management aimed at avoiding negative earnings surprises or
earnings decrease, the clients of these auditors are more (less) likely to meet or beat these two
benchmarks.
Treat equals one if the firm switches to a connected auditor, and zero otherwise. Firms switch-
ing from a non-connected auditor to a connected auditor constitute a treatment group (Treat = 1),
while firms switching from a non-connected auditor to another non-connected auditor are a con-
trol group (Treat = 0). Post is an indicator variable equal to one for the periods subsequent to
auditor switch, and zero otherwise.29 Thus, Post * Treat captures the incremental change in audit
quality for the treatment firms, relative to the control firms.30 Following prior research, we con-
trol for a comprehensive set of client- and auditor-specific characteristics that may affect audit
quality (Cohen et al., 2014; Dhaliwal et al., 2015; J. R. Francis et al., 2013; Reichelt & Wang,
2010). Definitions for those control variables are presented in the Appendix. In addition, we
include industry dummies to control for time-invariant industry-fixed effects and year dummies
to control for possible changes in audit quality over time, respectively.31 If hiring a connected
auditor impairs (improves) the subsequent audit quality for the home firm, we expect γ 3 > 0
(γ 3 < 0).
4. Empirical Results
4.1. Auditor Selection Analysis
Table 2, Panel A provides the transition matrix of Big 4 appointments for our sample firms.
Among 757 sample firms that change auditors, 172 clients of PwC switch to other Big 4 auditors.
Likewise, 171, 134, and 105 clients switch from EY, Deloitte, or KPMG, respectively. Also, 175
clients of non-Big 4 firms upgrade their auditors to Big 4 auditors. Among these sample firms,
133 clients switch to PwC as their incoming external auditor, while 228, 177, and 219 firms
28Our untabulated analyses show that the results are qualitatively similar when MeetConsensus is defined as one if
earnings meet or beat the latest analysts’ consensus earnings forecasts by one cent per share or less, and zero otherwise,
and MeetLast as one if the firm’s earnings in this year meet or beat its last year earnings by one percent of the market
capitalization at the beginning of the year, and zero otherwise.
29Since our auditor switches occur in Compustat fiscal years 2003–2015, the Post variable captures years up to 2017.
30Ai and Norton (2003) show that, in a logit model with interaction terms, the effect of the interaction term on expected
probability can be different in sign from the coefficient loading on the interaction term. However, Puhani (2012) shows
that, when the interaction term is simply the product of a treatment group dummy variable (e.g., Treat) and a treatment
period dummy variable (e.g., Post), the sign of the treatment effect is equal to the sign of the coefficient of the interaction
term. Based on insights derived from this study, we believe that it is appropriate to infer the sign of the treatment effect
based on the sign of the Post * Treat coefficient, as we have done.
31In all models for audit quality tests, continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%, and the p-values are calculated
with client firm-clustered standard errors.
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Table 2. Distribution of auditor switches.
Panel A: Transition Matrix
Incoming auditor
PwC EY Deloitte KPMG Total
Predecessor auditor PwC 57 65 50 172
EY 40 45 86 171
Deloitte 38 62 34 134
KPMG 26 45 34 105
Non-Big4 29 64 33 49 175
Total 133 228 177 219 757
Panel B: Auditor Selection Depending on the Presence of CEO/CFO-auditor Network ties
Incoming Auditor Connection #(AudChg) #(Hire) %(Hire) Diff P-value
PwC Yes 53 19 35.8% 14.4% 0.016**
No 532 114 21.4%
EY Yes 62 38 61.2% 25.0% 0.000***
No 524 190 36.2%
Deloitte Yes 35 16 45.7% 18.4% 0.019**
No 588 161 27.3%
KPMG Yes 57 28 49.1% 17.0% 0.009***
No 595 191 32.1%
Total Yes 207 101 48.8% 19.5% 0.000***
No 2,239 656 29.3%
Panel A reports a transition matrix of auditor changes in our sample. It includes the identities of predecessor and incoming
auditors and the number of clients for every combination of them. Panel B provides univariate test results of whether
clients with CEO/CFOs connected to XX auditor are more likely to hire XX as their external auditor. #(AudChg) is the
number of auditor change. #(Hire) is the number of clients hiring the given auditor XX. % (Hire) is #(Hire) divided
by #(AudChg). Diff is differences in %(Hire) between connected sample and unconnected sample. *, **, *** indicate
statistical difference from zero (two-tailed) at the < 0.10, < 0.05, and < 0.01 levels, respectively.
appoint EY, Deloitte, or KPMG, respectively. This distribution is similar to that reported by
Dhaliwal et al. (2015).
Table 2, Panel B provides univariate test results of whether clients tend to hire connected audi-
tors for each of the Big 4 auditors, respectively. It should be noted that firms currently hiring XX
auditor are excluded in XX selection analysis because they cannot switch to the same XX audi-
tor. This exclusion leaves 585, 586, 623, and 652 firms for each analysis for selecting PwC, EY,
Deloitte, or KPMG, respectively. For example, when we examine whether firms with CEO/CFO-
PwC network ties are more likely to hire PwC, we exclude 172 observations with PwC as a
predecessor. Among remaining 585 auditor change firms, Panel B reports that the CEO/CFOs of
53 firms are connected to PwC through their outside directorships, while the CEO/CFOs of the
other 532 firms do not have such a connection with PwC. More importantly, 19 of 53 firms with
CEO/CFO-PwC ties (35.8%) appoint PwC as their new auditor, while 114 of 532 firms with-
out such ties (21.4%) appoint PwC. This difference is statistically significant (p-value = 0.016),
indicating that clients with CEO/CFO-PwC ties are more likely to switch to PwC than clients
without such ties. The results are similar for EY (61.2 vs. 36.2% with p-value < 0.001), Deloitte
(45.7 vs. 27.3% with p-value = 0.019), and KPMG (49.1 vs. 32.1% with p-value = 0.009). The
last row of Panel B shows that the total number of observations with CEO/CFOs having con-
nections with any Big 4 auditors is 207 (53 + 62 + 35 + 57), while the number of observations
without such a connection is 2,239 (532 + 524 + 588 + 595). We find that 48.8% of the former
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firms appoint connected auditors, while just 29.3% of the latter firms appoint the respective audi-
tors. The difference is statistically significant at p < 0.001.32 Overall, our univariate analysis in
Table 2 provides preliminary support for H1.
Table 3, Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the auditor selec-
tion model for each Big 4 auditor. The panel shows that about 10% of the PwC sample have
CEO/CFO-PwC ties. Likewise, about 11, 6, and 9% of the sample for EY, Deloitte, and KPMG
are connected to EY, Deloitte, and KPMG, respectively.
Table 3, Panel B presents the logistic regression results of auditor selection decisions for
each Big 4 auditor. We find positive and significant coefficients on ConnXX for all Big 4 audi-
tors. These results suggest that home firms are more likely to hire auditors connected to their
CEO/CFOs when they switch auditors, in line with our univariate test results. In the logistic
regression, taking an exponential converts a coefficient into an odds ratio. In the analysis of
hiring PwC (EY, Deloitte, and KPMG), the odds ratio of ConnXX suggests that the odds of hir-
ing PwC (EY, Deloitte, and KPMG) is 1.72 (2.86, 2.08, and 1.92) times greater for firms with
CEO/CFO-PwC (EY, Deloitte, and KPMG) ties than those without such ties. Inferences for con-
trol variables are generally consistent with previous research (Dhaliwal et al., 2015; Lennox &
Park, 2007). For example, firms that hired Big 4 auditors previously (FBig4) are more likely to
appoint another Big 4 auditor. Consistent with Lennox and Park (2007) and Shu (2000), firms
tend to hire well-matched auditors (MatchXX ). Finally, firms with officers who formerly worked
for audit firms are more likely to hire their alumni (AlumniXX ).33,34 For robustness, we first
perform auditor selection analysis with a multinomial logit model instead of a set of binary ones
because a client may consider all Big 4 auditors at the same time. Using a reference group defined
as firms that appoint KPMG, we find that firms connected to PwC (Deloitte, EY) are more likely
to appoint PwC (Deloitte, EY) over KPMG, giving credence to our previous results. Second, we
further preform auditor selection analysis after including year- and industry-fixed effects in the
models or after limiting the sample to auditor dismissal observations only. Untabulated results
indicate that our main results remain qualitatively similar.
Table 3, Panel C provides logistic regression results of hiring a connected auditor using a
sample of home firms with at least one CEO/CFO-auditor interlock. Note that when a home firm
has more than one connection, we include the respective pairs in the sample.
Since both the embeddedness and agency views predict a positive relationship between
CEO/CFO-auditor ties and the appointment of connected auditors, it is difficult to discern which
view drives the results reported in Table 3, Panel B. It seems reasonable, however, to predict
that, under the embeddedness view, the likelihood of hiring a connected auditor is higher when
the connected auditor exhibits superior audit quality for the connected firm. Thus, we exam-
ine whether hiring a connected auditor is associated with observed audit quality at a connected
firm. The insignificant coefficients on ConnAQ1 through ConnAQ4 in columns (1) to (4) indicate
that the likelihood of hiring a connected auditor is not significantly associated with the connected
auditor’s audit quality. In addition, under the embeddedness view, since the governance body of a
home firm would not view hiring a connected auditor as harmful, the strength of the home firm’s
corporate governance should be positively or insignificantly associated with hiring a connected
32When we employ 33.3% as an alternative benchmark, which is a random probability that a Big 4 auditor is switched
to one of the other three Big 4 auditors, the difference is still significant at p < 0.001.
33To evaluate the economic importance of ConnXX against that of AlumniXX, we check whether the coefficient on
ConnXX is statistically different from that on AlumniXX in each of columns (1)–(4). We find that the differences are
statistically insignificant in all columns, suggesting that the economic magnitude of the effect of ConnXX on auditor
selection decisions is comparable to that of AlumniXX.
34Our results are robust when we add a bankruptcy score, leverage, an indicator for the issuance of debt and equity, board
independence, and an indicator for CEO-chairperson duality, following Lennox and Park (2007).
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auditor. In contrast, the agency view would predict that home firms with strong corporate gover-
nance are more likely to deter such hiring. In all of the four columns in Panel C, the coefficients
on GovIndex are negative and statistically significant, indicating that home firms with strong
Table 3. Auditor selection analyses
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
XX = PwC XX = EY XX = Deloitte XX = KPMG
Variable Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std
XX 0.23 0.42 0.39 0.49 0.29 0.46 0.34 0.48
ConnXX 0.10 0.29 0.11 0.31 0.06 0.23 0.09 0.29
SpecXX 0.43 0.50 0.26 0.44 0.19 0.39 0.15 0.36
MatchXX 0.18 0.39 0.59 0.50 0.15 0.35 0.08 0.28
AlumniXX 0.18 0.38 0.14 0.35 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30
FBig4 0.71 0.46 0.71 0.46 0.72 0.45 0.74 0.45
N 585 586 623 652
Panel B: Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep: PwC Dep: EY Dep: Deloitte Dep: KPMG
Variable Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value
Intercept − 1.95 0.001*** − 1.08 0.001*** − 1.63 0.001*** − 1.21 0.001***
ConnXX 0.544 0.083* 1.05 0.001*** 0.73 0.041** 0.653 0.023**
SpecXX 0.308 0.132 0.185 0.351 − 0.08 0.755 0.537 0.026**
MatchXX 0.203 0.440 0.416 0.019** 0.71 0.006*** 0.653 0.041**
AlumniXX 0.723 0.003*** 0.627 0.011** 0.262 0.376 0.687 0.012**
FBig4 0.48 0.042** 0.178 0.353 0.711 0.001*** 0.344 0.083*
N 585 586 623 652
Pseudo-R2 0.032 0.034 0.033 0.037
Panel C: Regression of Hiring Connected Auditors
Dep: HiringConn
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value
Intercept − 5.883 0.001*** − 3.266 0.083* − 3.579 0.063* − 6.016 0.001***
ConnAQ1 0.327 0.258
ConnAQ2 0.514 0.132
ConnAQ3 − 0.347 0.358
ConnAQ4 0.361 0.175
GovIndex − 0.517 0.066* − 0.825 0.018** − 0.782 0.032** − 0.525 0.062*
SameMSA 0.961 0.001*** 0.926 0.003*** 0.860 0.007*** 0.962 0.001***
SameInd 1.245 0.001*** 0.899 0.009*** 1.031 0.003*** 1.285 0.001***
MatchConn 0.401 0.139 0.515 0.105 0.397 0.222 0.407 0.134
AlumniConn 0.801 0.033** 0.831 0.074* 0.848 0.073* 0.792 0.035**
SpecConn 0.377 0.202 0.410 0.256 0.368 0.310 0.370 0.211
FBig4 − 0.148 0.680 − 0.477 0.271 − 0.336 0.439 − 0.108 0.765
LogTA 0.194 0.010*** 0.095 0.275 0.106 0.233 0.204 0.006***
(Continued).
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Table 3. Continued.
Panel C: Regression of Hiring Connected Auditors
Dep: HiringConn
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value
BankruptcyScore 0.009 0.717 − 0.008 0.803 − 0.005 0.866 0.009 0.721
LitIndustry − 0.359 0.211 0.315 0.346 0.399 0.247 − 0.350 0.221
AudDismissal 0.263 0.417 0.062 0.881 0.288 0.501 0.255 0.430
N 362 245 231 362
Pseudo-R2 0.135 0.124 0.120 0.136
Panel A provides descriptive statistics for variables used in auditor selection analyses. Panel B reports the regression
results of auditor selection. The dependent variable XX (PwC, EY, Deloitte, or KPMG) is an indicator variable equal
to one if the incoming audit firm is XX, and zero otherwise, where XX is PwC (PricewaterhouseCoopers), EY (Ernst
& Young), Deloitte, or KPMG. ConnXX is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO/CFO serves as an independent
director of another firm who hires the auditor XX, and zero otherwise. Panel C provides the regression results of hiring a
connected auditor. The sample consists of matched pairs of home and connected firms. When a home firm has more than
one connection, we include the respective pairs in the sample. HiringConn is an indicator variable equal to one if the
home firm hires its connected auditor, and zero otherwise. *, **, *** indicate statistical difference from zero (two-tailed)
at the < 0.10, < 0.05, and < 0.01 levels, respectively. Variable definitions are included in the Appendix.
corporate governance are less likely to appoint a connected auditor. Therefore, the findings in
Panel C are more consistent with the agency view than the embeddedness view.
We also predict that home firms are more likely to hire a connected auditor when such hiring
would induce connections at the audit office level. We define SameMSA as one if the incoming
auditor’s office and the connected auditor’s office are located in the same MSA (i.e. if the home
firm hires a new auditor located in the same MSA as the connected auditor’s office), and zero
otherwise. Columns (1) to (4) provide evidence consistent with this prediction by reporting that
the coefficients on SameMSA are positive and significant at p < 0.01.
Although not the focus of our research, the coefficients on SameInd are positive and signifi-
cant. Aobdia (2015) documents that rivals in the same industry do not share a common auditor if
the costs of information spillovers are substantial; however, if the costs are low, they tend to hire
a rival’s auditor in anticipation of greater industry expertise. The finding suggests that given that
the CEO/CFO director in our setting already plays a conduit role between home and connected
firms, the costs of information spillovers are not high when home firms hire a connected auditor.
4.2. Audit Quality Analysis
4.2.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 4, Panel A provides summary statistics for the dependent variables used for our audit
quality analyses. Among 1,632 firm-year observations used for the misstatement analysis, about
11.2% misstate their financial statements and subsequently restate them. The mean values of
|DA| and |PMDA| and are 0.056 and 0.091, respectively, which are comparable to those in prior
studies. Regarding the sample for meeting/beating analysis, 17.1 (33.0)% of the sample report
earnings that meet or just beat analysts’ consensus forecasts (last year earnings).
Table 4, Panel B presents descriptive statistics for control variables. The key statistics for
control variables are similar to those in prior research (Cohen et al., 2014; Reichelt & Wang,
2010). The mean values of firm size (LogTA) and return on assets (ROA) are 20.391 and − 0.017,
respectively. The mean value of non-audit fees paid to external auditors is 15.9% of total fees
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics for variables used in audit quality analyses
Panel A: Audit Quality Variables
Variable N Mean P5 P25 P50 P75 P95
Restatement 1,632 0.112 0 0 0 0 1
|DA| 1,280 0.056 0.003 0.017 0.038 0.074 0.165
|PMDA| 1,232 0.091 0.005 0.025 0.059 0.119 0.308
MeetConsensus 596 0.171 0 0 0 0 1
MeetLast 1,680 0.330 0 0 0 1 1
Panel B: Control Variables
LogTA 1,632 20.391 17.817 19.247 20.312 21.413 23.378
ROA 1,632 − 0.017 − 0.394 − 0.033 0.031 0.077 0.193
Market-to-Book 1,632 2.937 − 0.014 1.246 2.127 3.526 9.213
Issue 1,632 0.850 0 1 1 1 1
Leverage 1,632 0.243 0.000 0.047 0.218 0.362 0.651
FirmAge 1,632 22.928 5.000 11.000 17.000 32.000 56.000
AltmanZ 1,632 3.050 − 1 1 2 4 10
LitIndustry 1,632 0.272 0 0 0 1 1
NonAuditFeeRatio 1,632 0.159 0 0.029 0.115 0.240 0.501
MSALeader 1,632 0.381 0 0 0 1 1
NationalLeader 1,632 0.248 0 0 0 0 1
Cimportance 1,632 0.100 0.003 0.012 0.033 0.107 0.447
Big4 1,632 0.890 0 1 1 1 1
AlumniAud 1,632 0.155 0 0 0 0 1
CEOisChair 1,632 0.497 0 0 0 1 1
BDindep 1,632 0.820 0.600 0.778 0.857 0.889 0.917
ACexpertise 1,632 0.814 0 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Accr 1,632 − 0.081 − 0.275 − 0.110 − 0.061 − 0.023 0.049
StdSale 1,280 0.253 0.040 0.096 0.172 0.317 0.736
StdCFO 1,280 0.068 0.014 0.030 0.049 0.082 0.179
Panel C: Correlation
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Misstatement (1)
|DA| (2) 0.04
|PMDA| (3) 0.01 0.51
MeetConsensus (4) 0.04 − 0.09 0.03
MeetLast (5) 0.01 − 0.20 − 0.17 0.11
LogTA (6) − 0.06 − 0.16 − 0.14 0.01 0.09
ROA (7) − 0.02 − 0.29 − 0.24 0.04 0.23 0.32
Market-to-Book (8) 0.01 − 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.09 − 0.07 − 0.11
Issue (9) 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.00 − 0.04 0.07 − 0.10 0.02
Leverage (10) − 0.03 0.09 0.00 − 0.06 − 0.15 0.34 − 0.05 − 0.06
FirmAge (11) − 0.03 − 0.06 − 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.45 0.15 − 0.09
AltmanZ (12) − 0.01 − 0.18 − 0.09 0.10 0.26 − 0.08 0.25 0.14
LitIndustry (13) 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.00 − 0.15 − 0.15 0.07
NonAuditFeeRatio (14) 0.04 − 0.03 − 0.04 0.12 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.00
MsaLeader (15) 0.01 − 0.03 − 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.04 − 0.02
NationalLeader (16) 0.00 0.01 0.00 − 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.04 − 0.03
Cimportance (17) 0.04 − 0.03 − 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.06 − 0.04
Big4 (18) − 0.09 0.00 0.00 − 0.07 0.03 0.23 0.11 − 0.05
AlumniAud (19) 0.00 0.00 − 0.01 − 0.05 0.00 − 0.01 − 0.02 − 0.02
CEOisChair (20) − 0.01 − 0.06 − 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.11 0.05 0.00
BDindep (21) − 0.04 0.00 0.00 − 0.02 − 0.09 0.20 0.09 − 0.03
ACexpertise (22) − 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 − 0.02 0.07 0.10 0.00
Accr (23) 0.00 − 0.30 − 0.25 0.01 0.14 0.18 0.67 − 0.14
StdCFO (24) 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.00 − 0.07 − 0.16 0.00 0.01
StdSale (25) 0.09 0.16 0.15 − 0.01 − 0.11 − 0.38 − 0.44 0.12
(Continued).
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Table 4. Continued.
Panel C: Correlation
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Leverage (10) 0.26
FirmAge (11) − 0.08 0.05
AltmanZ (12) − 0.14 − 0.47 − 0.09
LitIndustry (13) − 0.07 − 0.17 − 0.16 0.08
NonAuditFeeRatio (14) 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.01
MsaLeader (15) 0.00 0.07 0.07 − 0.05 0.00 0.08
NationalLeader (16) 0.05 0.04 0.05 − 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.16
Cimportance (17) 0.05 0.04 0.08 − 0.05 − 0.07 0.00 − 0.06 − 0.04
Big4 (18) − 0.01 0.06 0.10 − 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.20 0.18
AlumniAud (19) 0.04 0.06 − 0.02 − 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.12
CEOisChair (20) − 0.02 0.10 0.06 0.01 − 0.01 0.09 0.04 − 0.01
BDindep (21) 0.08 0.03 0.18 − 0.10 − 0.11 − 0.06 0.04 0.02
ACexpertise (22) 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.00 − 0.05 − 0.18 0.00 0.01
Accr (23) − 0.07 − 0.08 0.16 0.12 − 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.02
StdCFO (24) 0.04 − 0.07 − 0.22 0.06 0.06 0.00 − 0.02 0.00
StdSale (25) 0.07 − 0.12 − 0.24 0.00 0.17 0.00 − 0.04 − 0.06
(17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24)
Big4 (18) − 0.18
AlumniAud (19) − 0.07 0.15
CEOisChair (20) 0.00 0.03 − 0.03
BDindep (21) 0.01 0.14 0.05 − 0.16
ACexpertise (22) − 0.03 0.06 0.00 − 0.14 0.24
Accr (23) 0.06 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.06
StdCFO (24) 0.03 − 0.05 0.01 0.03 − 0.03 0.01 − 0.02
StdSale (25) − 0.07 − 0.11 0.04 0.02 − 0.04 − 0.05 − 0.21 0.33
Panel A provides descriptive statistics for audit quality proxies. The statistics for each variable are based on the sample
for the respective analysis. Panel B provides descriptive statistics for control variables for audit quality analyses. Panel
C presents the correlation between variables. Correlation coefficients statistically significant at p < 0.01 are in bold.
The statistics for all variables with the exception of StdCFO and StdSale are based on the sample for the misstatement
analysis. Regarding StdCFO and StdSale, the statistics are based on the sample for the discretionary accruals analysis.
Variable definitions are included in the Appendix.
(NonAuditFeeRatio). In addition, 81.4% of our sample have at least one accounting expert on
the AC (ACexpertise), and board independence (BDindep) is 82.0% on average.
Table 4, Panel C reports the correlation matrix. Most of the correlation coefficients between
control variables are lower than 0.2. So, multicollinearity does not appear to be an important
concern.
4.2.2. Multivariate regression analyses of audit quality
Table 5 reports the regression results of audit quality analyses. As a proxy for audit quality,
we employ misstatement in column (1), absolute discretionary accruals in columns (2) and (3),
and tendency to meet or just beat earnings benchmarks in columns (4) and (5), respectively.
Under the agency (embeddedness) view, we expect that home firms will experience a decline
(improvement) in audit quality after hiring a connected auditor, relative to those hiring a non-
connected auditor.
In column (1), the coefficient on Post * Treat is positive and significant at p < 0.05, suggest-
ing that the increase in the likelihood of misstatements subsequent to auditor switch is greater























Table 5. Regression of audit quality on hiring connected auditors
Misstatement |DA| |PMDA| MeetConsensus MeetLast
Variable Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value
Intercept − 4.985 0.024** 0.075 0.028** 0.113 0.040** − 11.428 0.000*** − 4.864 0.000***
Post − 0.759 0.003*** − 0.008 0.035** − 0.008 0.176 − 0.132 0.666 − 0.156 0.314
Treat − 0.861 0.041** − 0.012 0.044** − 0.008 0.340 − 0.266 0.710 − 0.289 0.315
Post * Treat 1.133 0.033** 0.022 0.008*** 0.020 0.083* 1.103 0.209 0.660 0.052*
LogTA − 0.109 0.352 − 0.004 0.008*** − 0.003 0.211 0.217 0.125 0.213 0.001***
ROA − 0.203 0.788 − 0.084 0.000*** − 0.119 0.000*** − 0.620 0.490 3.454 0.000***
Market-to-Book 0.010 0.675 0.000 0.895 0.000 0.562 − 0.019 0.675 0.045 0.009***
Issue 0.484 0.151 0.000 0.847 − 0.002 0.807 0.574 0.248 0.091 0.613
Leverage − 0.911 0.190 0.020 0.279 0.020 0.348 − 1.393 0.260 − 1.691 0.000***
FirmAge 0.000 0.980 0.000 0.079* 0.000 0.976 − 0.003 0.779 − 0.003 0.515
AltmanZ − 0.031 0.430 0.000 0.380 0.000 0.678 0.022 0.640 0.088 0.002***
LitIndustry 0.238 0.594 0.007 0.349 0.017 0.082* − 0.121 0.831 0.120 0.650
NonAuditFeeRatio 0.720 0.341 − 0.015 0.193 − 0.028 0.088* 0.564 0.622 0.068 0.881
MSALeader 0.268 0.235 − 0.003 0.372 − 0.001 0.794 − 0.200 0.553 − 0.021 0.883
NationalLeader 0.022 0.925 0.000 0.870 0.003 0.663 − 0.041 0.881 0.018 0.908
Cimportance 1.004 0.084* 0.006 0.418 0.018 0.138 − 0.480 0.653 0.088 0.813
Big4 − 0.478 0.181 0.008 0.232 0.013 0.168 − 1.076 0.099* 0.256 0.374
AlumniAud 0.052 0.857 − 0.003 0.404 − 0.002 0.770 − 0.403 0.327 0.094 0.609
CEOisChair − 0.138 0.568 − 0.003 0.366 − 0.007 0.196 0.596 0.051* 0.244 0.091*
BDindep − 0.048 0.974 0.033 0.154 0.009 0.768 0.738 0.743 − 2.359 0.008***
ACexpertise 0.132 0.623 − 0.002 0.602 0.006 0.442 1.359 0.009*** − 0.175 0.410
Accr 0.061 0.958 − 1.763 0.326 0.481 0.622
StdCFO 0.105 0.017** 0.103 0.068*
StdSale 0.004 0.594 0.007 0.567
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1632 1280 1232 596 1680
Pseu-R2/Adj-R2 0.162 0.141 0.094 0.196 0.197
This table reports regression results of audit quality on hiring connected auditors. Treat is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm switches to a connected auditor, and zero
otherwise. Post is an indicator variable equal to one for the periods subsequent to auditor change, and zero otherwise. *, **, *** indicate statistical difference from zero (two-tailed) at
the < 0.10, < 0.05, and < 0.01 levels, respectively. P-values are calculated using firm-clustered standard errors. Variable definitions are included in the Appendix.
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negative coefficient on Post is consistent with the declining trend of misstatements over time
(Scholz, 2014).35,36 In columns (2) and (3), we use the absolute value of discretionary accru-
als estimated by the modified Jones model and performance-matched discretionary accruals as
proxies for audit quality, respectively, while in columns (4) and (5), we use meeting or beating
analysts’ consensus earnings forecasts and last year earnings as proxies, respectively. Consistent
with the result in column (1), all coefficients on Post * Treat in columns (2) to (5) are positive,
and all but one in column (4) are statistically significant, suggesting that the increases in the mag-
nitude of absolute discretionary accruals and the propensity to meet or beat earnings benchmarks
subsequent to auditor changes are significantly greater for firms hiring connected auditors, com-
pared to those for firms hiring non-connected auditors. These results imply that hiring connected
auditors leads to a more lenient audit and greater tolerance of earnings management, support-
ing the agency view in H2b. The signs of control variables are generally consistent with prior
research. For brevity, we do not discuss them in detail.
4.2.3. Multivariate regression analyses of audit quality: Same audit office effect
This section examines whether the negative relation between CEO/CFO-auditor interlocks and
audit quality is more pronounced when the interlocks are established at the local office level.
When home and connected firms appoint auditors from the same local office, the CEO/CFOs
are likely not only to have greater bargaining power over the connected auditor but also to form
a closer relationship with the auditor. At the same time, this situation will foster information
transfer between the CEO/CFO and the audit office. Therefore, the effect of network ties between
CEO/CFO and auditor on audit quality can be more pronounced when home and connected firms
hire auditors from the same office.
To examine this prediction, we estimate the audit quality models after splitting all CEO/CFO-
auditor interlocks into the interlocks through the same office, Treat (Same Off.), and the interlocks
through different audit offices of the connected audit firm, Treat (Diff. Off.). In other words, Treat
(Same Off.) equals one if the firm switches to a connected auditor through the same audit office,
and zero otherwise. Treat (Diff. Off.) equals one if Treat is equal to one and Treat (Same Off.) is
equal to zero, and zero otherwise. Table 6 presents the results. In all five columns, the coefficients
on Post * Treat (Same Off.) are positive and significant, indicating that the firms switching to
a connected audit office are more likely to exhibit a decrease in audit quality subsequent to
auditor changes, compared to firms switching to a non-connected auditor. To the contrary, the
coefficients on Post * Treat (Diff. Off.) are all insignificant except for column (2). The lack
of statistical significance in most columns indicates that the decrease in audit quality is less
pronounced when the home firms switch to a different audit office of the connected auditor.
Collectively, the findings in Table 6 suggest that the negative effect of hiring connected auditors
on subsequent audit quality is stronger when the CEO/CFO-auditor interlocks are built at the
local office level.
4.2.4. Tests with propensity score matched sample
Despite our research design of a DID model, it remains possible that the difference in firm char-
acteristics between treatment and control samples, rather than our variable of interest (hiring
35When we estimate the misstatement regression in column (1) without the interaction term, Post * Treat, we continue
to find that the coefficient on Post is negative and statistically significant.
36A negative coefficient on Treat implies that, in the pre-auditor switch period, treatment firms are less likely to misstate
their financial statements, relative to control firms. This outcome could derive from differences in firm characteristics
between two groups, such as firm size. To mitigate the concern about differences in firm characteristics, we replicate our























Table 6. Regression of audit quality on hiring connected auditors: same office effect
Misstatement |DA| |PMDA| MeetConsensus MeetLast
Variable Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value
Intercept − 5.009 0.024** 0.075 0.028** 0.115 0.037** − 11.484 0.000*** − 4.862 0.000***
Post − 0.757 0.003*** − 0.008 0.037** − 0.008 0.168 − 0.139 0.647 − 0.155 0.318
Treat (Same Off.) − 0.907 0.150 − 0.016 0.054* − 0.015 0.169 − 0.789 0.279 − 0.448 0.260
Treat (Diff. Off.) − 0.824 0.117 − 0.009 0.234 − 0.003 0.776 0.345 0.762 − 0.157 0.686
Post * Treat (Same Off.) 1.415 0.082* 0.025 0.025** 0.039 0.035** 1.725 0.041** 1.012 0.047**
Post * Treat (Diff. Off.) 0.790 0.157 0.019 0.072* 0.006 0.634 0.530 0.703 0.363 0.373
LogTA − 0.110 0.348 − 0.004 0.008*** − 0.003 0.202 0.214 0.124 0.213 0.001***
ROA − 0.205 0.787 − 0.084 0.000*** − 0.119 0.000*** − 0.658 0.459 3.446 0.000***
Market-to-Book 0.010 0.664 0.000 0.900 0.000 0.523 − 0.015 0.748 0.046 0.007***
Issue 0.487 0.154 0.000 0.841 − 0.001 0.840 0.594 0.235 0.098 0.585
Leverage − 0.928 0.188 0.020 0.276 0.020 0.362 − 1.367 0.261 − 1.710 0.000***
FirmAge 0.000 0.993 0.000 0.085* 0.000 0.942 − 0.003 0.785 − 0.003 0.507
AltmanZ − 0.032 0.421 0.000 0.392 0.000 0.682 0.024 0.607 0.087 0.003***
LitIndustry 0.245 0.583 0.006 0.364 0.017 0.075* − 0.113 0.842 0.120 0.648
NonAuditFeeRatio 0.732 0.337 − 0.015 0.193 − 0.028 0.088* 0.627 0.583 0.070 0.877
MSALeader 0.256 0.258 − 0.003 0.368 − 0.001 0.745 − 0.175 0.607 − 0.025 0.864
NationalLeader 0.042 0.860 0.000 0.870 0.003 0.625 − 0.015 0.957 0.029 0.851
Cimportance 0.983 0.090* 0.006 0.403 0.018 0.138 − 0.551 0.596 0.074 0.843
Big4 − 0.475 0.183 0.008 0.233 0.014 0.156 − 1.005 0.120 0.253 0.380
AlumniAud 0.033 0.909 − 0.003 0.424 − 0.002 0.726 − 0.449 0.284 0.087 0.637
CEOisChair − 0.132 0.585 − 0.003 0.376 − 0.007 0.200 0.628 0.039** 0.246 0.090*
BDindep 0.000 0.999 0.033 0.161 0.009 0.767 0.690 0.759 − 2.363 0.007***
ACexpertise 0.133 0.622 − 0.003 0.595 0.006 0.438 1.347 0.010** − 0.175 0.413
Accr 0.069 0.952 − 1.678 0.353 0.521 0.595
StdCFO 0.104 0.018** 0.101 0.070*
StdSale 0.004 0.604 0.007 0.563
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1632 1280 1232 596 1680
Pseu-R2/Adj-R2 0.163 0.14 0.093 0.198 0.198
This table reports regression results of audit quality proxies on hiring auditors connected through the same office. Treat (Same Off.) is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm
switches to a connected auditor through the same audit office, and zero otherwise. Treat (Diff. Off.) is an indicator variable equal to one if Treat is equal to one and Treat (Same Off.) is
equal to zero, and zero otherwise. Post is an indicator variable equal to one for the periods subsequent to auditor change, and zero otherwise. *, **, *** indicate statistical difference
from zero (two-tailed) at the < 0.10, < 0.05, and < 0.01 levels, respectively. P-values are calculated using firm-clustered standard errors. Variable definitions are included in the
Appendix.
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connected auditors), drives our results of audit quality analyses. In other words, if the con-
trol firms do not share similar firm characteristics with the treatment firms, this difference may
introduce bias in evaluating the consequences of the treatment effect. To mitigate this concern,
we perform a matched-sample analysis based on propensity score matching (PSM), following
Lawrence et al. (2011) and Shipman et al. (2017). Note that since we are not able to perform a
meaningful PSM analysis for meeting or beating analysts’ consensus forecasts due to the small
sample size, we use the other four audit quality proxies in this section.
We first calculate the likelihood that a firm switches to a connected auditor (i.e. a propensity
score) by estimating a logistic regression model in which the dependent variable equals one if
the firm switches to a connected auditor and zero otherwise, and the independent variables are all
control variables used in the audit quality model, Eq. (3). We measure the independent variables
in the year prior to auditor switch.37 We match a firm switching to a connected auditor (i.e. a
treatment firm) with a firm switching to a non-connected auditor (i.e. a control firm) that has the
closest propensity score with replacement.38
Table 7, Panel A shows the mean differences in the independent variables between the treat-
ment and control samples before and after PSM. Before the matching, treatment firms are larger
(LogTA), older in firm age (FirmAge), have more independent board of directors (BDindep), and
are less volatile (lower standard deviation of cash flows from operations, StdCFO, and lower
standard deviation of sales, StdSale) than control firms. After PSM, none of these firm character-
istics is significantly different between two samples, indicating that our matching is conducted
effectively.
When we replicate our audit quality analyses with the PSM sample, the results are largely
consistent with those reported earlier. In Table 7, Panel B (Panel C), we perform regression
analyses of audit quality reported in Table 5 (Table 6), based on the PSM matched sample. In
Panel B, all coefficients on Post * Treat are positive, two of which are statistically significant
in column (1) and (2), providing weak support for the hypothesis that home firms are more
likely to experience a decrease in audit quality after switching to a connected auditor, relative to
those hiring a non-connected auditor. In panel C, all coefficients on Post * Treat (Same Off.) are
positive and significant, offering confirmatory evidence that home firms’ audit quality is more
likely to be impaired after hiring a connected audit office. On the other hand, all coefficients
on Post * Treat (Diff. Off.) are insignificant. In conclusion, our PSM sample tests suggest that
the decline in audit quality subsequent to switching to a connected auditor is unlikely to be
attributable to the observable difference in firm characteristics.39
4.3. Additional Analyses
We perform several additional analyses. First, one might argue that AC-auditor ties through out-
side directorship also affect auditor selection decisions and subsequent audit quality. To examine
whether the AC-auditor ties confound our findings, we repeat analyses after controlling for this
relationship. We find that AC-auditor ties have no significant impact on auditor selection and
37Shipman et al. (2017) state that ‘PSM should not include variables in the matching stage that are excluded from MR’
[multiple regression].’ We follow this guideline in performing PSM.
38To keep all treatment firms, we do not require a maximum caliper distance in this PSM matching. Our inferences,
however, remain similar when we enforce maximum caliper widths of 0.05, 0.1, and 0.3, although the sample size in
each analysis becomes smaller. In addition, the results are qualitatively similar when we replicate the analyses without
replacement.
39One disadvantage of our PSM model is a small sample size relative to the number of predictors, which reduces the
statistical power of our tests. To alleviate this concern, we alternatively estimate each model using bootstrap. For each
analysis, we generate 100 datasets from the original sample. The number of observations in each of the 100 samples is























Table 7. Audit quality analyses using propensity score matched sample
Panel A: Differences in Characteristics in the Year prior to Auditor Switch













Variable N Mean N Mean p-value N Mean N Mean p-value
LogTA 62 21.338 346 20.191 0.000*** 62 21.338 62 21.129 0.465
ROA 62 − 0.014 346 − 0.019 0.916 62 − 0.014 62 − 0.025 0.852
Market-to-Book 62 3.198 346 2.903 0.660 62 3.198 62 3.094 0.908
Issue 62 0.887 346 0.844 0.340 62 0.887 62 0.871 0.785
Leverage 62 0.266 346 0.236 0.274 62 0.266 62 0.283 0.627
FirmAge 62 27.516 346 21.529 0.020** 62 27.516 62 27.516 1.000
AltmanZ 62 2.566 346 3.256 0.107 62 2.566 62 2.579 0.980
LitIndustry 62 0.290 346 0.269 0.733 62 0.290 62 0.274 0.843
NonAuditFeeRatio 62 0.161 346 0.164 0.899 62 0.161 62 0.155 0.833
MSALeader 62 0.339 346 0.393 0.413 62 0.339 62 0.435 0.272
NationalLeader 62 0.177 346 0.246 0.211 62 0.177 62 0.177 1.000
Cimportance 62 0.141 346 0.109 0.211 62 0.141 62 0.121 0.499
Big4 62 0.790 346 0.783 0.901 62 0.790 62 0.790 1.000
AlumniAud 62 0.097 346 0.133 0.392 62 0.097 62 0.097 1.000
CEOisChair 62 0.484 346 0.500 0.817 62 0.484 62 0.484 1.000
BDindep 62 0.844 346 0.815 0.034** 62 0.844 62 0.849 0.748
ACexpertise 62 0.823 346 0.812 0.845 62 0.823 62 0.855 0.629
Accr 62 − 0.084 346 − 0.084 0.999 62 − 0.084 62 − 0.084 0.997
StdCFO 53 0.051 267 0.074 0.003*** 53 0.051 53 0.051 0.992







Panel B: Regression of Audit Quality.
Misstatement |DA| |PMDA| MeetLast
Variable Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value
Post − 1.321 0.107 − 0.002 0.670 − 0.002 0.814 1.083 0.488
Treat − 0.82 0.216 − 0.009 0.122 − 0.02 0.059* − 0.77 0.651
Post * Treat 2.058 0.042** 0.017 0.072* 0.025 0.127 2.16 0.238
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 496 424 408 520
Pseu-R2/Adj-R2 0.431 0.1 0.1 0.258
Panel C: Regression of Audit Quality: Same Office Effect
Misstatement |DA| |PMDA| MeetLast
Variable Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value
Post − 1.349 0.102 − 0.002 0.696 − 0.003 0.798 1.167 0.464
Treat (Same Off.) − 0.724 0.393 − 0.015 0.082* − 0.027 0.077* − 2.175 0.242
Treat (Diff. Off.) − 0.937 0.318 − 0.006 0.421 − 0.014 0.263 2.565 0.317
Post * Treat (Same Off.) 2.662 0.015** 0.023 0.069* 0.048 0.041** 4.83 0.023**
Post * Treat (Diff. Off.) 1.296 0.179 0.013 0.275 0.007 0.650 − 1.349 0.634
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 496 424 408 520
Pseu-R2/Adj-R2 0.438 0.096 0.102 0.261
This table provides empirical results using propensity score matched sample. Panel A provides mean differences in independent variables of audit quality models between the treatment
and control samples before and after propensity score matching. For these comparisons, we use observations in the year prior to auditor switch. The statistics for all variables, except
StdCFO and StdSale are based on the sample for misstatement analysis. Regarding StdCFO and StdSale, the statistics are based on the sample for discretionary accruals analysis. Panel
B reports regression results of audit quality. Panel C reports regression results of audit quality on hiring auditors connected through the same office. To obtain matched samples, the
propensity score is calculated from the logistic model in which the dependent variable is equal to one if the firm hires a connected auditor, and zero otherwise and the independent
variables are extracted from the respective audit quality regression model. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix.
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have no systematic, consistent evidence on audit quality. More importantly, our main findings
remain qualitatively similar after the AC-auditor ties are controlled for in each model.
Second, we examine whether CEO-auditor and CFO-auditor ties have different implications
for auditor selection decisions and subsequent audit quality. When we replicate four auditor
selection regressions using CEO-auditor ties, untabulated results show all positive coefficients
for ConnXX, two of which are statistically significant at p < 0.05. We find comparable results
when we test with CFO-auditor ties. Furthermore, when we repeat audit quality analyses, untab-
ulated results indicate that our inferences remain largely similar when we examine CEO-auditor
and CFO-auditor interlocks separately.
Third, it is possible that the effect of CEO/CFO-auditor connections on auditor selection deci-
sions and audit quality is stronger when the CEO/CFO serves on the AC of the connected firm
because they could build closer network ties, given that the AC oversees all audit-related mat-
ters. To examine this issue empirically, we re-perform auditor selection and audit quality analyses
after splitting the connection sample firms into two groups depending on whether the CEO/CFO-
auditor connection is formed via AC membership at the connected firm or non-AC membership.
Untabulated results suggest that the two groups do not exhibit significantly different effects on
auditor selection decisions and audit quality.40
Fourth, when we exclude firms switching from non-Big 4 auditors from the sample, our results
from auditor selection analyses remain similar. Regarding audit quality tests, we find qualita-
tively similar evidence for all measures but |DA|. When |DA| is used as a proxy for audit quality,
we lose statistical significance.
Fifth, while we focus on the effect of hiring interlocked auditors on the home firm’s audit qual-
ity, one may suspect that the connected firm’s audit quality also changes subsequent to the home
firm’s appointment of the connected auditor.41 Our untabulated analyses find that the changes in
audit quality for the connected firms of our treatment firms are statistically indifferent from those
in connected firms of our control firms, suggesting that the adverse effect of CEO/CFO-auditor
ties on audit quality exists only for the home firms.
5. Conclusion
This study investigates whether CEO/CFO-auditor interlocks through outside directorship affect
auditor selection decisions and whether hiring connected auditors influences subsequent audit
quality. Our results show that home firms with such ties are more likely to hire connected audi-
tors. We also find that switching to such connected auditors results in lower audit quality, as
evidenced by the increases in the likelihood of misstatements, the magnitude of absolute discre-
tionary accruals, and the propensity to meet or beat earnings benchmarks. This evidence is more
pronounced when the connection is built at the local office level.
This study provides useful policy implications. First, while SOX mandates that the AC be
solely responsible for auditor selection, our evidence indicates that some managers continue
to influence auditor appointment decisions by utilizing their networks. This finding suggests
40A possible reason for insignificant differences is small size of the sample that switched to connected auditors, which
could lower statistical powers in our models. Among 757 firms switching to Big 4 auditors, the number of firms with
CEO/CFO-auditor ties via AC membership is 143, while that with CEO/CFO-auditor ties via board membership is 244.
Moreover, the number of firms switching to connected auditors based on AC memberships is only 46, compared to 101
based on board membership.
41To examine this possibility, we adopt a DID research design in which we compare the changes in audit quality from
the pre- to post-auditor-switch periods for the connected firms of our treatment firms, with the changes in audit quality
for other connected firms of our control firms, using the same audit quality proxies.
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that the ACs of these firms fail to remove managers’ influence over auditor appointment, which
eventually leads to lower audit quality. Second, although SOX enforces various mechanisms to
strengthen auditor independence and audit quality, our results indicate that external networks
between managers and auditors can still undermine auditor independence and audit quality.
Thus, this study highlights the importance of AC effectiveness and auditor independence in the
presence of CEO/CFO-auditor interlocks.
Our study is subject to several caveats. First, we do not directly operationalize network ties of
managers to audit engagement partners. We believe that PCAOB’s recent disclosure requirement
of engagement audit partner identity would enable advancing this research to the audit partner
level, although time is needed to accumulate sufficient data. Second, our analyses are limited to
the appointments of Big 4 auditors. Thus, our results may not be generalizable to firms switching
to non-Big 4 auditors. Third, the number of firms that switch to connected auditors in our sample
is small, which might explain why some results of our audit quality tests are weak.
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Appendix: Variable Definitions
Variable: Definition:
Variables Included in Auditor Choice Analyses
XX indicator variable equal to one if the incoming auditor is XX, and zero
otherwise, where XX is either PwC, EY, Deloitte, or KPMG.
ConnXX indicator variable equal to one if CEO/CFOs serve as an independent
director of another firm who hires the auditor XX, and zero otherwise.
SpecXX indicator variable equal to one if the auditor XX has the largest market
share of audit fees in the industry-year cohort that the given client
belongs to, and zero otherwise.
MatchXX indicator variable equal to one if the firm is better matched with XX than
with any of the other Big 4 auditors, and zero otherwise. Following
Lennox and Park (2007) and Dhaliwal et al. (2015), we begin with
COMPUSTAT and Audit Analytics to identify Big 4 clients from
2003 to 2012 and estimate four logistic regression models where the
dependent variable is each of Big 4 auditors and independent variables
are firm size, financial health, and the client’s industry identity
(based on two-digit SIC codes). Using estimated coefficients from the
four regressions, we measure the degree to which a given client is
closely matched with each auditor’s existing clients. For example, a
client is better matched with PwC’s clientele if the client’s estimated
probability of matching with PwC’s clientele is the highest.
(Continued).
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Variable: Definition:
AlumniXX indicator variable equal to one if the CEO, CFO, or Chief Accounting
Officer (CAO) formerly worked for the auditor XX, and zero
otherwise.
Fbig4 indicator variable equal to one if the predecessor auditor was a Big 4
auditor, and zero otherwise.
HiringConn indicator variable equal to one if the home firm hires its connected
auditor, and zero otherwise.
ConnAQ1 indicator variable equal to one if the connected firm does not misstate its
financial statement in the past two years, and zero otherwise.
ConnAQ2 (ConnAQ3) indicator variable equal to one if the average of the connected firm’s
absolute discretionary accruals measured by the Modified-Jones model
(by the Kothari et al.’s (2005) model) in the past two years belong to
the lowest quartile, and zero otherwise.
ConnAQ4 indicator variable equal to one if the connected firm does not meet or just
beat last year earnings in the past two years, and zero otherwise.
GovIndex indicator variable if the home firm’s corporate governance index is equal
to or greater than its median of our sample, and zero otherwise where
the index is the sum of the followings: I (the CEO does not hold the
position of chairman), I (the CEO/CFO is externally hired), I (the
home firm’s board independence is equal to or greater than its median
of our sample), I (the home firm’s co-opted directors is lower than
its median of our sample), and I (the home firm’s audit committee
includes at least one accounting expert) where I (.) is the operator
to return one if the condition of the argument is satisfied, and zero
otherwise. For any of five dimensions, if I (.) yields one, it means that
the firm has a strong corporate governance for the dimension.
SameMSA indicator variable equal to one if the home firm’s incoming auditor’s
office and the connected auditor’s office are located in the same MSA,
and zero otherwise.
SameInd indicator variable equal to one if the home firm and its connected firm are
in the same industry (i.e. two-digit SIC code), and zero otherwise.
MatchConn indicator variable equal to one if the connected auditor is better matched
with the home firm than with any of the other big 4 auditors, and zero
otherwise.
AlumniConn indicator variable equal to one if the home firm’s CEO, CFO, or CAO
formerly worked for the connected auditor, and zero otherwise.
SpecConn indicator variable equal to one if the connected auditor has the largest
market share of audit fees in the industry-year in the MSA that the
given client belongs to, and zero otherwise.
LogTA natural logarithm of total assets.
BankruptcyScore bankruptcy score, calculated by – 4.336 + ( − 4.512 * return on
assets) + (5.679 * debt/assets) + (0.004 * current ratio).
LitIndustry indicator variable equal to one if the firm operates in a highly litigious
industry defined as industries with SIC codes of 2833–2836,
3570–3577, 3600–3674, 5200–5961, 7370–7370, and zero otherwise.
AudDismissal Indicator variable equal to one if the home firm dismisses its auditor, and
zero otherwise (i.e. if the auditor resigns).
Variables Included in Audit Quality Analyses
Misstatement indicator variable equal to one if the earnings for the firm-year are
overstated and subsequently restated downward, and zero otherwise.
|PMDA| absolute value of performance-matched discretionary accruals by the
Kothari et al.’s (2005) model.
|DA| absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated by the modified-Jones
model.
(Continued).
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Variable: Definition:
MeetConsensus indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s annual earnings meet or beat
the latest analysts’ consensus earnings forecasts by three cents per
share or less, and zero otherwise.
MeetLast indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s annual earnings meet or beat
its last year earnings by three percent of the market capitalization at
the beginning of the year, and zero otherwise.
Post indicator variable equal to one for the periods subsequent to auditor
switch, and zero otherwise.
Treat indicator variable equal to one if the firm switches to a connected auditor,
and zero otherwise.
Treat (Same Off.) indicator variable equal to one if the firm switches to a connected auditor
through the same audit office, and zero otherwise.
Treat (Diff. Off.) indicator variable equal to one if Treat is equal to one and Treat (Same
Off.) is equal to zero, and zero otherwise.
ROA return on assets, defined as net income divided by total assets.
Market-to-Book market value of equity divided by the book value of equity.
Issue indicator variable equal to one if the sum of the equity and debt issued
during the most recent three years is greater than five percent of total
assets, and zero otherwise.
Leverage The sum of long term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by total
assets.
AltmanZ Probability of bankruptcy based on the Altman’s Z score (Altman, 1983).
FirmAge the number of years the firm has Compustat data.
NonAuditFeeRatio non-audit service fees divided by total fees paid to the auditor.
MsaLeader indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s auditor is office-level industry
specialist auditor following Reichelt and Wang (2010), and zero
otherwise.
NationalLeader indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s auditor is the national-level
industry specialist auditor following Reichelt and Wang (2010), and
zero otherwise.
Cimportance ratio of the client’s audit fees to the audit office’s total revenues from
audit services.
Big4 indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s auditor is one of Big 4 audit
firms, and zero otherwise.
AlumniAud indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s CEO, CFO, or CAO formerly
worked for the auditor, and zero otherwise.
CEOisChair indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is the chairperson of the board,
and zero otherwise.
BDindep the proportion of independent directors on the board.
ACexpertise indicator variable equal to one if audit committee includes at least one
accounting expert, and zero otherwise. A director is defined as an
accounting expert if he/she has work accounting experience as certified
public accountants, CFO, controller, or vice president of finance,
following Dhaliwal et al. (2015).
Accr total accruals divided by total assets.
StdCFO standard deviation of cash flows from operations scaled by lagged total
assets from t-4 to t.
StdSale standard deviation of sales scaled by lagged total assets from t-4 to t.
